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CASE COMMENTS
its decision on the fact that the founding fathers intended the use of
the paper ballot.
The case which the court cites to sustain its position is Nicholas v.
Minton,3 in which the Massachusetts court held a similar act invalid.
The constitutional requirements were that officers "shall be chosen by
written votes" and that those commissioned to conduct the election
shall "sort and count the votes, and form a list of the persons voted
for, with the number for each person against his name" and "make a
fair record of the same" and "a public declaration thereof."
It is submitted that it is possible to distinguish the two cases
because of the difference in the two constitutional provisions. A marked
vote is not a written one; a deposited vote is not one to be sorted and
counted. There may be sufficient compliance with the Kentucky consti-
tution without a paper ballot which is marked. The same result
required by the constitution, a secret ballot, is reached by the use of
the machine. The word "marked" is defined by Webster's New Inter-
national Dictionary as "indicated". The same authority defines "de-
posited" as "put" or "lay down". When a voter operates a voting
machine, he indicates his choice and puts it down on the recording
apparatus in much the same manner as if he had marked a ballot and
deposited it in a ballot box. Bearing in mind the definitions of the
words given and the principle of construction which the court recog-
nizes in the case, that language of the constitution which is capable
of expansion will be so interpreted and held adaptable to the conditions
of present day society,' it is submitted that the Kentucky Constitution
should be held to authorize the use of voting machines.
JoHIN PAUL Cuay, JR.
HOMICIDE-AIDING AND ABETTING-MORAL DUTY TO ACT.
Defendant became engaged in a roadside fight with deceased at a
dance. W entered the fight to aid defendant. Defendant thereupon
withdrew from the fight and ordered the crowd which had gathered to
stand back. Deceased died from knife wounds inflicted by W, and the
trial court convicted both defendant and W of voluntary manslaughter.
Upon appeal the decision of the trial court was affirmed with the fol-
lowing comment: "He (defendant) stood by and looked on and saw
his large, strong companion stab (deceased) to death and did nothing
to prevent it and commanded the crowd to stand back and nobody
bother them, thereby aiding and encouraging W in stabbing (deceased)
and deterring bystanders from interfering and preventing W from
killing (deceased)." Wright v. Commonwealth, 272 Ky. 77 (1938).
This case is illustrative of the extent to which our law has
3 196 Mass. 410, 82 N. E. 50 (1907); Contra, Opinion of the Justices,
178 Mass. 605, 60 N. E. 129 (1901).
'117 S. W. (2) 918, 920.
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encroached upon moral obligation in establishing legal reason for
punishment.
Defendant's duty to protect deceased from death at the hands of
W was, at most, a moral obligation, and, although the failure to act
is definitely reprehensible, it cannot subject defendant to punishment
at the hands of the law.1 And the fact that the altercation between
defendant and deceased was primarily responsible for bringing on the
fatal encounter is immaterial.2 Then the only real issue for considera-
tion here is whether a command by an unarmed man to a crowd of men
to prevent interference with a roadside brawl will be sufficient to war-
rant a conviction of manslaughter as aider and abettor when the brawl
results in the homicide of one of the participants.
It may safely be declared as the law in this Commonwealth that
one may aid and abet the crime of manslaughter, and that the principal
actor, the aider and abettor, and the accessory before the fact are all
principals in the first degree and equally guilty, and may be so accused
and convicted.3 However, to make defendant an aider and abettor, he
must do or say something showing his consent to the felonious purpose
and contributory to its execution.' The consent in itself is not suffi-
cient, since it does not come up to the meaning of the words "aid and
abet".5
The effect (contribution to the execution of the felonious purpose)
of defendant's command to the crowd, though indicative of his consent
to the actions of W, would seem to be practically insignificant as
compared to the effect of the possession of a dangerous weapon by W
himself. It seems more reasonable to believe that the crowd was
afraid to approach the contestants due to possession of a dangerous
weapon by the enraged and half-crazed W than it was afraid of the
commands of the unarmed defendant. Then it would seem that the
underlying factor in this conviction lies in the prevalence of a pro.
nounced moral turpitude.
Nevertheless, there is a legal presumption prevalent in this Com-
monwealth which lends legal reason to the conviction. When one Is
present encouraging, assisting, or advising another to do an unlawful
act, regardless to what degree such advice, assistance, or encourage-
I People v. Beardsley, 150 Mich. 206, 113 N. W. 1128 (1907); Rex v.
Smith, 2 C. & P. 449, 12 E. C. L. 668 (1825).
2 Landrum v. Commonwealth, 123 Ky. 472, 96 S. W. 587 (1906).
3 Polly v. Commonwealth, 15 K. L. R. 502, 24 S. W. 7 (1893);
Tucker v. Commonwealth, 145 Ky. 84, 140 S. W. 73 (1911).
'Karnes v. Commonwealth, 125 Va. 758, 99 S. E. 562 (1919); Chap-
man v. State, 43 Tex. Cr. Rep. 328, 65 S. W. 1098 (1901); Connaughty
v. State, 1 Wis. 159, 60 Am. Dec. 370 (1853).
5 "There is a plain distinction between consenting to a crime and
aiding and abetting in its perpetration. Aiding and abetting are
affirmative in their character; consenting may be a mere negative
acquiescence, not in any way known to the principal malefactor."
White v. People, 81 Ill. 333, 337 (1876).
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ment is effective, the law presumes that the one acting is induced to
commit the act by the presence and encouragement of the other.6 And,
although moral turpitude played the major role in the conviction, this
presumption affords legal reason to the decision.
J. Wiar TunNm
'Bast v. Commonwealth, 124 Ky. 747, 99 S, W. 978 (1909).
